Precise zero knowledge introduced by Micali and Pass (STOC'06) guarantees that the view of any verifier V can be simulated in time closely related to the actual (as opposed to worstcase) time spent by V in the generated view. We provide the first constructions of precise concurrent zero-knowledge protocols. Our constructions have essentially optimal precision; consequently this improves also upon the previously tightest non-precise concurrent zero-knowledge protocols by Kilian and Petrank (STOC'01) and Prabhakaran, Rosen and Sahai (FOCS'02) whose simulators have a quadratic worst-case overhead. Additionally, we achieve a statisticallyprecise concurrent zero-knowledge property-which requires simulation of unbounded verifiers participating in an unbounded number of concurrent executions; as such we obtain the first (even non-precise) concurrent zero-knowledge protocols which handle verifiers participating in a super-polynomial number of concurrent executions.
Introduction
Zero-knowledge interactive proofs, introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [GMR85] are constructs allowing one player (called the Prover) to convince another player (called the Verifier) of the validity of a mathematical statement x ∈ L, while providing no additional knowledge to the Verifier. The zero-knowledge property is formalized by requiring that the view of any PPT verifier V in an interaction with a prover can be "indistinguishably reconstructed" by a PPT simulator S, interacting with no one, on input just x. Since whatever V "sees" in the interaction can be reconstructed by the simulator, the interaction does not yield anything to V that cannot already be computed with just the input x. Because the simulator is allowed to be an arbitrary PPT machine, this traditional notion of ZK only guarantees that the class of PPT verifiers learn nothing. To measure the knowledge gained by a particular verifier, Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson [GMW87] (see also [Gol01] ) put forward the notion of knowledge tightness: intuitively, the "tightness" of a simulation is a function relating the (worst-case) running-time of the verifier and the (expected) running-time of the simulator-thus, in a knowledge-tight ZK proof, the verifier is guaranteed not to gain more knowledge than what it could have computed in time closely related to its worst-case running-time.
Micali and Pass [MP06] recently introduced the notion of precise zero knowledge (originally called local ZK in [MP06] ). In contrast to traditional ZK (and also knowledge-tight ZK), precise ZK considers the knowledge of an individual verifier in an individual execution-it requires that the view of any verifier V , in which V takes t computational steps, can be reconstructed in time closely related to t-say 2t steps. More generally, we say that a zero-knowledge proof has precision p(·, ·) if the simulator uses at most p(n, t) steps to output a view in which V takes t steps on common input an instance x ∈ {0, 1} n .
This notion thus guarantees that the verifier does not learn more than what can be computed in time closely related to the actual time it spent in an interaction with the prover. Such a guarantee is important, for instance, when considering knowledge of "semi-easy" properties of the instance x, considering proofs for "semi-easy" languages L, or when considering deniability of interactive protocols (see [MP06, Pas06] for more discussion).
The notion of precise ZK, however, only considers verifiers in a stand-alone execution. A more realistic model introduced by Dwork, Naor and Sahai [DNS98] , instead considers the execution of zero-knowledge proofs in an asynchronous and concurrent setting. More precisely, we consider a single adversary mounting a coordinated attack by acting as a verifier in many concurrent sessions of the same protocol. Concurrent zero-knowledge proofs are significantly harder to construct and analyze.
Richardson and Kilian [RK99] constructed the first concurrent zero-knowledge argument in the standard model (without any extra set-up assumptions). Their protocol requires O(n ) number of rounds. Kilian and Petrank [KP01] later improved the round complexity toÕ(log 2 n). Finally, Prabhakaran, Rosen and Sahai [PRS02] provided a tighter analyis of the [KP01] simulator showing thatÕ(log n) rounds are sufficient. However, none of the simulators exhibited for these protocols are precise, leaving open the following question:
Do there exist precise concurrent zero-knowledge proofs (or arguments)?
In fact, the simulators of [RK99, KP01, PRS02] are not only imprecise, but even the overhead of the simulator with respect to the worst-case running-time of the verifier-as in the definition of knowledge tightness-is high. The simulator of [RK99] had worst-case precision p(n, t) = t O(log n t) -namely, the running-time of their simulator for a verifier V with worst-case running-time t is p(n, t) on input a statement x ∈ {0, 1} n . This was significantely improved by [KP01] who obtained a quadratic worst-case precision, namely p(n, t) = O(t 2 ); the later result by [PRS02] did not improve upon this, leaving open the following question:
Do there exist concurrent zero-knowledge arguments (or proofs) with sub-quadratic worstcase precision?
Our Results. Our main result answers both of the above questions in the affirmative. In fact, we present concurrent zero-knowledge protocols with essentially optimal precision. Our main lemma shows the following.
Lemma 1 (Main Lemma). Assuming the existence of one-way functions, for every k, g ∈ N such that k/g ∈ ω(log n), there exists an O(k)-round concurrent zero knowledge argument with precision p(t) ∈ O(t · 2 log g t ) for all languages in N P.
By setting k and g appropriately, we obtain a simulation with near-optimal precision. Theorem 1. Assuming the existence of one-way functions, for every ε > 0, there exists a ω(log n)-round concurrent zero knowledge argument for all languages in N P with precision p(t) = O(t 1+ε ).
Theorem 2. Assuming the existence of one-way functions, for every ε > 0, there exists an O(n ε )-round concurrent zero knowledge argument for all languages in N P with precision p(t) = O(t2 2 log n t ). As a corollary, we obtain the following: For every > 0, there exists an O(n ε )-round protocol P, V such that for every c > 0, P, V is a concurrent zero knowledge argument with precision p(n, t) = O(t) with respect to verifiers with running time bounded by n c for all languages in N P.
Finally, we also construct statistically-precise concurrent ZK arguments for all of N P, which requires simulation of all verifiers, even those having a priori unbounded running time.
Theorem 3. Assume the existence of claw-free permutations, then there exists a poly(n)-round statistically precise concurrent zero-knowledge argument for all of N P with precision p(t) = t 1+ 1 log n .
As far as we know, this is the first (even non-precise) concurrent ZK protocol which handles verifiers participating in an unbounded number of executions. Previous work on statistical concurrent ZK also considers verifiers with an unbounded running-time; however, those simulations break down if the verifier can participate in a super-polynomial number of executions.
Our Techniques. Micali and Pass show that only trivial languages have black-box simulator with polynomial precision [MP06] . To obtain precise simulation, they instead "time" the verifier and then try to "cut off" the verifier whenever it attempts to run for too long. A first approach would be to adapt this technique to the simulators of [RK99, KP01, PRS02] . However, a direct application of this cut-off technique breaks down the correctness proof of these simulators.
To circumvent this problem, we instead introduce a new simulation technique, which rewinds the verifier obliviously based on time. In a sense, our simulator is not only oblivious of the content of the messages sent by the verifier (as the simulator by [KP01] ), but also oblivious to when messages are sent by the verifier! The way our simulator performs rewindings relies on the rewinding schedule of [KP01] , and our analysis relies on that of [PRS02] . However, obtaining our results requires us to both modify and generalize this rewinding schedule and therefore also change the analysis. In fact, we cannot use the same rewinding schedule as KP/PRS as this yields at best a quadratic worst-case precision.
Definitions and Preliminaries
Notation. Let L denote an NP language and R L the corresponding NP-relation. Let (P,V) denote an interactive proof (argument) system where P and V are the prover and verifier algorithms respectively. By V * (x, z, •) we denote a non-uniform concurrent adversarial verifier with common input x and auxiliary input (or advice) z whose random coins are fixed to a sufficiently long string chosen uniformly at random; P(x, w, •) is defined analogously where w ∈ R L (x).
Note that V * is a concurrent adversarial verifier. Formally, it means the following. Adversary V * , given an input x ∈ L, interacts with an unbounded number of independent copies of P (all on common input x) 1 . An execution of a protocol between a copy of P and V * is called a session. Adversary V * can interact with all the copies at the same time (i.e., concurrently), interleaving messages from various sessions in any order it wants. That is, V * has control over the scheduling of messages from various sessions. In order to implement a scheduling, V * concatenates each message with the session number to which the next scheduled message belongs. The prover copy corresponding to that session then immediately replies to the verifier message as specified by the protocol. The view of concurrent adversary V * in a concurrent execution consists of the common input x, the sequence of prover and verifier messages exchanged during the interaction, and the contents of the random tape of V * .
Let view V * (x,z,•) be the random variable denoting the view of V * (x, z, •) in a concurrent interaction with the copies of P(x, w, •). Let view S V * (x,z,•) denote the view output by the simulator. When the simulator's random tape is fixed to r, its output is instead denoted by view S V * (x,z,r) . Finally, let T S V * (x,z,r) denote the steps taken by the simulator and let T V * (view) denote the steps taken by V * in the view view. For ease of notation, we will use view V * to abbreviate view V * (x,z,•) , and view S V * to abbreviate view S V * (x,z,•) , whenever it is clear from the context. Definition 1 (Precise Concurrent Zero Knowledge). Let p : N × N → N be a monotonically increasing function. (P,V) is a concurrent zero knowledge proof (argument) system with precision p if for every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial time V * , the following conditions hold:
1. For all x ∈ L, z ∈ {0, 1} * , the following distributions are computationally indistinguishable over L:
2. For all x ∈ L, z ∈ {0, 1} * , and every sufficiently long r ∈ {0, 1} * , it holds that:
When there is no restriction on the running time of V * and the first condition requires the two distributions to be statistically close (resp., identical), we say (P, V) is statistical (resp., perfect) zero knowledge.
Next, we briefly describe some of the cryptographic tools used in our construction.
Special Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge (HVZK). A (three round) protocol is special-HVZK if, given the verifier's challenge in advance, the simulator can construct the first and the last message of the protocol such that the simulated view is computationally indistinguishable from the real view of an honest verifier. The Blum-Hamiltonicity protocol [Blu87] used in our construction is special-HVZK. When the simulated view is identical to the real view, we say the protocol is perfect-special-HVZK.
View Simulation. We assume familarity with the notion of "simulating the verifier's view". In particular, one can fix the random tape of the adversarial verifier V * during simulation, and treat V * as a deterministic machine.
Perfectly/Statistically Binding Commitments. An (interactive) perfectly/statistically binding commitment scheme is a protocol between a "sender" (with input a value v) and a "receiver" (with no inputs) with two phases: Commit and Decommit. At the end of commit phase, the sender is committed to the value v. Later, the sender can use the decommit phase to demonstrate that it committed to the value v in the commit phase. We say that the scheme is "perfectly/statistically binding and computationally hiding" if the following two properties hold:
Perfectly/Statistically Binding. The scheme is perfectly (resp., statistically) binding if, after the commit phase, even a computationally unbounded sender cannot convincingly decommit to two different values v = v with probability more than zero (resp., negligible in the security parameter).
Computationally Hiding. The scheme is said to be computationally hiding if, after the commit phase, a probabilistic polynomial time receiver cannot differentiate between the commitments of any two values v 0 and v 1 with probability negligibly more than 1/2 (in the security parameter). This holds even if the values v 0 , v 1 are chosen by the receiver.
Such commitment schemes are known based on the existence of one way function [Nao91, HILL99]. Naor's scheme has a two round commit phase where the first message is sent by the receiver. Thereafter, the sender can create the commitment using a randomized algorithm, denoted c ← com pb (v). The decommitment phase is only one round, in which the sender simply sends v and the randomness used, to the receiver. This will be denoted by (v, r) ← dcom pb (c).
Our Protocol
We describe our Precise Concurrent Zero-Knowledge Argument, PCZK, in Figure 1 . It is a slight variant of the PRS-protocol [PRS02] ; in fact, the only difference is that we pad each verifier message with the string 0 l if our zero knowledge simulator (found in Figure 5 ) requires l steps of computation to produce the next message (l grows with the size of x). For simplicity, we use perfectly binding commitments in PCZK, although it suffices to use statistically binding commitments, which in turn rely on the existence of one way functions. The parameter k determines the round complexity of PCZK.
Since our PCZK-protocol is just an instantiation of the PRS-protocol (with extra padding), it is both complete and sound.
Our Simulator and its Analysis

Overview
At a high level, our simulator receives several opportunities to rewind the verifier and extract the "trapdoor" σ that will allow it to complete the simulation. More precisely, our simulator will attempt to rewind the verifier in one of the k "slots" (i.e. a message pair (Pj), (Vj) ) in the first stage. If at any point it obtains the decommitment information for two different challenges (Pj), the simulator can extract the secret σ (that the verifier sends in the Stage 2) and simulate the rest of the protocol using the special-HVZK property of the BH-protocol.
To handle concurrency and precision, consider first the KP/PRS simulator. This simulator relies on a static and oblivious rewinding schedule, where the simulator rewinds the verifier after some fixed number of messages, independent of the message content. Specifically, the total number of verifier messages over all sessions are divided into two halves. The KP/PRS-rewinding schedule recursively invokes itself on each of the halves twice (completing two runs of the first half before proceeding to the two runs of the second half). The first run of each half is called the primary thread, and the latter is called the secondary thread. As shown in [KP01, PRS02] , after the verifier commits to σ in any given session s, the KP/PRS-simulator gets several opportunities to extract it before Stage 2 of session s begins. We also call the thread of execution in the final output by the simulator the main thread. The KP/PRS-simulator keeps uses the secondary threads (recursively) as the main thread; all other threads, used to gather useful information for extracting σ, are called look-ahead threads. However, since the verifier's running time in look-ahead threads could be significantly longer than its running time in the main thread, the KP/PRS-simulator is not precise. On the other hand, consider the precise simulation by Micali and Pass [MP06] . When rewinding a verifier, the MP simulator cuts off the second run of the verifier if it takes more time than the first run, and outputs the view of the verifier on the first run. Consequently, the running time of the simulator is proportional to the running time of the verifier on the output view. In order to apply the MP "cut" strategy on top of the KP/PRS-simulator, we need to use the primary thread (recursively) as the main output thread, and "cut" the secondary thread with respect to the primary thread. However, this cut-off will cause the simulator to abort more often, which significantly complicates the analysis.
To circumvent the above problems, we introduce a new simulation technique. For simplicity, we first present a simulator that knows an upper bound to the running-time of the verifier. Later, using a standard "doubling" argument, we remove this assumption. Like the KP/PRS-rewinding schedule, our simulator is oblivious of the verifier. But instead of rewinding based on the number of messages sent, we instead rewind based on the number of steps taken by the verifier (and thus
The Blum-Hamiltonicity(BH) Protocol [Blu87] .
p: Choose a random permutation π of vertices V . Commit to the adjacency matrix of the permuted graph, denoted π(G), and the permutation π, using a perfectly binding commitment scheme. Notice that the adjacency matrix of the permuted graph contains a 1 in position (π(i), π(j)) if (i, j) ∈ E. Send both the commitments to the verifier.
v: Select a bit σ ∈ {0, 1}, called the challenge, uniformly at random and send it to the prover.
p: If σ = 0, send π along with the decommitment information of all commitments. If σ = 1 (or anything else), decommit all entries (π(i), π(j)) with (i, j) ∈ C by sending the decommitment information for the corresponding commitments.
v: If σ = 0, verify that the revealed graph is identical to the graph π(G) obtained by applying the revealed permutation π to the common input G. If σ = 1, verify that all the revealed values are 1 and that they form a cycle of length n. In both cases, verify that all the revealed commitments are correct using the decommitment information received. If the corresponding conditions are satisfied, accept the proof, otherwise reject the proof.
Figure 2: The Blum-Hamiltonicity protocol used in PCZK this simulator is oblivious not only to the content of the messages sent by the verifier, but also to the time when these messages are sent!). In more detail, our simulator divides the total running time T of V * into two halves and executes itself recursively on each half twice. In each half, we execute the primary and secondary threads in parallel. As we show later, this approach results in a simulation with quadratic precision.
To improve the precision, we further generalize the KP/PRS rewinding schedule. Instead of dividing T into two halves, we instead consider a simulator that divides T into g parts, where g is called the splitting factor. By choosing g appropriately, we are able to provide precision p(t) ∈ O(t 1+ ) for every constant . Furthermore, we show how to achieve essentially linear precision by adjusting both k (the round complexity of our protocol) and g appropriately.
Worst Case Quadratic Simulation
We first describe a procedure that takes as input a parameter t and simulates the view of the verifier for t steps. The simulate procedure described in Figure 3 employs the KP rewinding method with the changes discussed earlier. In Stage 1, simulate simply generates uniformly random messages. simulate attempts to extract σ using rewindings, and uses the special honest-verifier ZK property of the BH protocol to generate Stage 2 messages. If the extraction of σ fails, it outputs ⊥. The parameter st is the state of V * from which the simulation should start, and the parameter H is simply a global history of all "useful messages" for extracting σ. 2 Let st 0 be the initial state of V * and d = d t be the maximum recursion depth of simulate(t, st 0 , ∅). The actual precise simulator constructed in the next section uses simulate as a sub-routine, for which we show some properties below. In Proposition 2, we show that simulate(t, st 0 , ∅) has a worst case running time of O(t 2 ), and in Proposition 3 we show that simulate outputs ⊥ with negligible probability. Proof. We partition the running time of simulate into the time spent emulating V * , and the time spent simulating the prover (i.e. generating prover messages). By construction, simulate(t, ·, ·) spends time at most t emulating V * on main thread. Furthermore, the number of parallel executions double per level of recursion. Thus, the time spent in simulating V * by simulate(t, ·, ·) is t · 2 d , where the d is the maximum depth of recursion. Since d = d t = log 2 t ≤ 1 + log 2 t, we conclude that simulate spends at most 2t 2 steps emulating V * . To compute the time spent simulating the prover, recall that the verifier pads each messages with 0 l if the simulate requires l steps of computation to generate the next message. Therefore, simulate always spends less time simulating the prover than V * giving us a bound of 2 · 2t 2 = 4t 2 on the total running time.
Proposition 3. The probability that simulate outputs ⊥ is negligible in n.
Proof. The high-level structure of our proof follows the proof of PRS. We observe that simulate outputs ⊥ only when it tries to generate Stage 2 messages. We show in Lemma 4 that for each session, the probability of outputting ⊥ for the first time on any thread is negligible. Since simulate only runs for polynomial time, there are at most polynomial sessions and threads. 4 Therefore, we conclude using the union bound that simulate outputs ⊥ with negligible probability.
The prove Procedure. Let s ∈ [m] be the session for which the prove procedure is invoked. The procedure outputs either p or p, whichever is required by S V * . Let hist denote the set of messages exchanged between S V * and V * in the current thread. The prove procedure works as follows.
If the
Step p of BH-protocol. Otherwise (i.e., if σ h = 1), commit to the entries of the adjacency matrix of the complete graph K n and to a random permutation π. Lemma 4. For any session s 0 and any thread l 0 (called the reference session and the reference thread), the probability that session s 0 and thread l 0 is the first time simulate outputs ⊥ is negligible.
Proof. Recall that for simulate to extract σ, V * needs to reply to two different challenges (Pj) with corresponding (Vj) messages (j ≥ 1) (after V * has already committed to σ). Since simulate generates only polynomially many uniformly random (Pj) messages, the probability of any two challenge being identical is exponentially small in n. Therefore, it is sufficient to bound the probability conditioned on simulate never repeating the same challenge. 5 We now proceed using a random-tape counting argument similar to PRS. For a fixed session s 0 and thread l 0 , we call a random tape ρ bad, if running simulate with that random tape makes it output ⊥ first on session s 0 in thread l 0 . The random tape is called good otherwise. As in PRS, we show that every bad random tape can be mapped to a set of super-polynomially many good random tapes. Furthermore, this set of good random tapes is unique. Such a mapping implies that the probability of a random tape being bad is negligible. Towards this goal, we provide a mapping f that takes a bad random tape to a set of good random tapes.
To construct f , we need some properties of good and bad random tapes. We call a slot (i.e. a message pair (Pj), (Vj) ) good if the verifier does not ABORT on this challenge. Then:
1. When simulate uses a bad random tape, all k slots of session s 0 on thread l 0 are good.
(Otherwise, simulate can legitimately abort session s 0 without outputting ⊥.)
2. A random tape is good if there is a good slot such that (1) it is on a non-reference thread l = l 0 , (2) it occurs after V * has committed to σ with message (V0) on thread l 0 , and (3) it occurs before the Stage 2 message (p) takes place on thread l 0 . This good slot guarantees that simulate can extract σ if needed.
Properties 1 and 2 together give the following insight: Given a bad tape, "moving" a good slot from the reference thread l 0 to a non-reference thread produces a good random tape. Moreover, the rewind-schedule of simulate enables us to "swap" slots across threads by swapping segments of simulate's random tape. Specifically, whenever simulate splits into primary and secondary processes, the two processes share the same start state, and are simulated for the same number of steps in parallel; swapping their random tapes would swap the simulation results on the corresponding threads 6 .
We define a rewinding interval to be a recursive execution of simulate on the reference thread l 0 that contains a slot, i.e. a (Pj), (Vj) -pair, but does not contain the initial message (V0) or the Stage 2 message (p). A minimal rewinding interval is defined to be a rewinding interval where none of its children intervals (i.e. smaller recursive executions of simulate on l 0 ) contain the same slot (i.e. both (Pj) and (Vj)). Following the intuition mentioned above, swapping the randomness of a rewinding interval with its corresponding intervals on non-reference threads will generate a good tape (shown in Claim 3).
We next construct the mapping f to carry out the swapping of rewinding intervals in a structured way. Intuitively, f finds disjoint subsets of minimal rewinding intervals and performs the swapping operation on them. The f we use here is exactly the same mapping constructed in PRS (see Figure  5 .4 of [Ros04] , or the appendix for a more detailed description). Even though our simulator differs from that of PRS, the mapping f works on any simulator satisfying the following two properties: (1) Each rewinding is executed twice. (2) Any two rewindings are either disjoint or one is completely contained in the other.
We proceed to give four properties of f . Claim 1 bounds the number of random tapes produced by f based on the number of minimal rewinding intervals, while Claim 2 shows that f maps different bad tapes to disjoint sets of tapes. Both these properties of f syntactically follows by using the same proof of PRS for any simulator that satisfy the two properties mentioned above and we inherit them directly. In the following claims, ρ denotes a bad random tape.
Claim 1 (f produces many tapes). |f (ρ)| ≥ 2 k −d , where k is the number of minimal rewinding intervals and d is the maximum number of intervals that can overlap with each other.
Remark:
We reuse the symbol d since the maximum number of intervals that can overlap each other is just the maximum depth of recursion.
Claim 2 (f produces disjoint sets of tapes). If ρ = ρ is another bad tape, f (ρ) and f (ρ ) are disjoint.
Proof. These two claims were the crux of [PRS02, Ros04] . See Claim 5.4.12 and Claim 5.4.11 in [Ros04] , for more details. We remark that Claim 1 is proved with an elaborate counting argument. Claim 2, on the other hand, is proved by constructing an "inverse" of f based on the following observation. On a bad tape, good slots appear only on the reference thread l 0 . Therefore, given a tape produced by f , one can locate the minimal intervals swapped by f by searching for good slots on non-reference threads, and invert those swappings.
In Claim 3 we show that, the tapes produced by f are good, while Claim 4 counts the number of minimal rewinding intervals. These two claims depend on how simulate recursively calls itself and hence we cannot refer to PRS for the proof of these two claims; nevertheless, they do hold with respect to our simulator as we prove below.
Precise Quadratic Simulation
Recall that simulate takes as input t, and simulates the verifier for t steps. Since the actual simulator S V * (described in Figure 5 ) does not know a priori the running time of the verifier, it calls simulate with increasing values oft, doubling every time simulate returns an incomplete view. On the other hand, should simulate ever output ⊥, S V * will immediately output ⊥ as will and terminate. Also, S V * runs simulate with two random tapes, one of which is used exclusively whenever simulate is on the main thread. Since, S V * uses the same tape every time it calls simulate, the view of V * on the main thread proceeds identically in all the calls to simulate.
S V * (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ), where ρ 1 and ρ 2 are random tapes.
2. While simulate did not generate a full view of V * :
, where random tape ρ 1 is exclusively used to simulate the verifier on the main thread, and random tape ρ 2 is used for all other threads.
(c) output ⊥ if simulate outputs ⊥ 3. Output the full view V * (i.e., random coins and messages exchanged) generated on the final run of simulate(t, st, ∅)
Figure 5: The Quadratically Precise Simulator.
Lemma 5 (Concurrent Zero Knowledge). The ensembles view S V * (x, z) x∈L,z∈{0,1} * and {view V * (x, z)} x∈L,z∈{0,1} * are computationally indistinguishable over L.
Proof. We consider the following "intermediate" simulator S that on input x (and auxiliary input z), proceeds just like S (which in turn behaves like an honest prover) in order to generate messages in Stage 1 of the view. Upon entering Stage 2, S outputs ⊥ if S does; otherwise, S proceeds as an honest prover in order to generate messages in Stage 2 of the view. Indistinguishability of the simulation by S then follows from the following two claims:
Claim 5. The ensembles {view S V * (x, z)} x∈L,z∈{0,1} * and {view V * (x, z)} x∈L,z∈{0,1} * are statistically close over L.
Proof. We consider another intermediate simulator S that proceeds identically like S except that whenever S outputs ⊥ in a Stage 2 message, S instead continues simulating like an honest prover. Essentially, S never fails. Since S calls simulate for several values of t, this can skew the distribution. However, recall that the random tape fed by S into simulate to simulate the view on the main thread is identical for every call. Therefore, the view on the main thread of simulate proceeds identically in every call to simulate. Thus, it follows from the fact that the Stage 1 messages are generated uniform at random and that S proceeds as the honest prover in Stage 2, the view output by S and the view of V * are identically distributed. It remains to show that view output by S and S are statistically close over L. The only difference between S and S is that S outputs ⊥ sometimes. It suffices to show that S outputs ⊥ with negligible probability. From Proposition 3, we know that simulate outputs ⊥ only with negligible probability. Since simulate is called at most logarithmically many times due to the doubling of t, using the union bound we conclude that S outputs ⊥ with negligible probability.
Claim 6. The ensembles {view S V * (x, z)} x∈L,z∈{0,1} * and {view S V * (x, z)} x∈L,z∈{0,1} * are computationally indistinguishable over L.
Proof. The only difference between S and S is in the manner in which the Stage 2 messages are generated. Indistinguishability follows from the special honest-verifier ZK property using a standard hybrid argument, as given below.
Assume for contradiction that there exists a verifier V * , a distinguisher D and a polynomial p(·) such that D distinguishes the ensembles {view S V * (x, z)} and {view S V * (x, z)} with probability 1 p(n) . Furthermore, let the running time of V * be bounded by some polynomial q(n). We consider a sequence of hybrid simulators, S i for i = 0 to q(n). S i proceeds exactly like S, with the exception that in the first i proofs that reach the second stage, it proceeds using the honest prover strategy in the second stage for those proofs. By construction S 0 = S and S q(n) = S (since there are at most q(n) sessions, bounded by the running time of the simulators). By assumption the output of S 0 and S q(n) are distinguishable with probability 1 p(n) , so there must exist some j such that the output of S j and S j+1 are distinguishable with probability 1 p(n)q(n) . Furthermore, since S j proceeds exactly as S j+1 in the first j sessions that reach the second stage, and by construction they proceed identically in the first stage in all sessions, there exists a partial view v of S j and S j+1 -which defines an instance for the protocol in the second stage of the j + 1 session-such that the output of S j and S j+1 are distinguishable, conditioned on the event that S j and S j+1 feed V * the view v. Since the only difference between the view of V * in S j and S j+1 is that the former is a simulated view, while the later is a view generated using an honest prover strategy, this contradicts the special honest-verifier ZK property of the BH-protocol in the second stage of the protocol.
Lemma 6 (Quadratic Precision). Let view S V * be the output of the simulator S V * , and t be the running time of V * on the view view S V * . Then, S V * runs in time O(t 2 ).
Proof. Recall that, S V * runs simulate with increasing values oft, doubling each time, until a view is output. We again use the fact that the view on the main thread of simulate proceeds identically (in this case, proceeds as view S V * ) since the random tape used to simulate the main thread is identical in every call to simulate. Therefore, the final value oft when v is output satisfies, t ≤t < 2t
The running time of S V * is simply the sum of the running times of simulate(t, st, ∅) with t = 1, 2, 4, . . . ,t. By Lemma 2, this running time is bounded by
For some constant c.
Improved Precision
We now consider a generalized version of simulate. Let g ≥ 2 be an integer; simulate g (t, ·, ·) will now divide t in g smaller intervals. If t does not divide into g evenly, that is if t = qg + r with
The simulate g (t, st, H) Procedure.
1. If t = 1, (a) If the next scheduled message, p u , is a first stage prover message, choose p u uniformly. Otherwise, if p u is a second stage prover message, compute p u using the prove procedure. Feed p u to the verifier. If the next scheduled message is verifier's message, run the verifier from its current state st for exactly 1 step. If the verifier outputs a message v u , store it in H.
(b) Update st to the current state of V * . Output (st, H).
2. Otherwise (i.e., t > 1), for i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , g:
(a) Execute the following two processes in parallel : (st g , H) , and the view of V * on the thread connecting st, st 1 , . . . , and st g . Figure 6 : simulate with splitting factor g. r > 0, let the first r sub-intervals have length t/g + 1, and the rest of the g − r sub-intervals have length t/g . We call g the splitting factor, and assume k/g ∈ ω(log n) as stated in Theorem 1. We first establish the precision of our new simulator.
Output
Lemma 7 (Improved Precision). Let view S V * be the output of the simulator S V * using simulate g , and t be the running time of V * on the view view S V * . Then, S V * runs in time O(t · 2 log g t ) = O(t 1+log g 2 ).
Proof. As in Lemma 6, the running time of S V * is the sum of the running time of simulate g (t, st, ∅) with t = 1, 2, 4, . . . ,t, where t ≤t < 2t. By Lemma 2, simulate g (t, ·, ·) runs in time O(t2 d ). Since the recursive depth d for simulate g is log g t , the running time of simulate g is O(t2
Summing over the different values of t, we conclude that the running time of S V * is bounded by:
1+log g 2 for some constant c.
Next, we proceed to show indistinguishability of the simulator's output.
Lemma 8 (Concurrent Zero Knowledge). view S V * (x, z) x∈L,z∈{0,1} * and {view V * (x, z)} x∈L,z∈{0,1} * are computationally indistinguishable over L.
Proof. Following essentially the same approach for the precise quadratic simulator in the previous section, we prove this in two steps. First, we show that the probability that the simulator outputs ⊥ is negligible. Then, conditioned on the simulator not outputting ⊥, the view output by the simulator is "correctly" distributed. In fact, it suffices to show the first step, and the second step follows identically using the argument as before, since the view output by the simulator (if it outputs one) is the same independent of the splitting factor g. Now, we proceed to show the first step. As shown in section 4.2, to prove that the simulator outputs ⊥ with negligible probability, it is enough to show that every bad random tape can be mapped to super-polynomially many good random tapes. In fact, we will use the same f as in section 4.2, and reexamine the properties of f . Claims 1 and 2 remains unchanged since the mapping f and the definition of minimal rewinding intervals have not changed. Claims 3 and 4, however, may change since they depend on how simulate g recursively calls itself. Below, we give the modified versions of the two claims. Claim 7 is analogous to Claim 3:
Claim 7. The set f (ρ)\{ρ} contains only good tapes (for simulate g ).
Proof. The proof of Claim 3 does not depend on the splitting factor g, and therefore still holds with respect to procedure simulate g .
Claim 8 is analogous to Claim 4. This claim however depends on the splitting factor g and is modified as follows:
Claim 8 (Number of Minimal Rewinding Intervals). There are at least k = k g−1 − 2d minimal rewinding intervals for session s 0 on thread l 0 (for simulate g ), where d is the recursion depth.
Proof. First, we ignore that minimal rewinding intervals do not contain the messages (V0) and (p), and focus on "potential" minimal rewinding intervals that contain a slot. For each slot, there exists a corresponding rewinding interval of minimal size that contains the slot. Note that at most g − 1 slots may share the same minimal rewinding interval (if g slots share the same minimal rewinding interval, then at least one slot is properly contained in one of the g child rewinding intervals). Therefore, among the k minimum rewinding intervals there are at least k/(g − 1) "potential" minimum rewinding intervals. Recall again, that at each level of recursion, at most two intervals may contain (V0) or (p). Thus, there are at least k/(g − 1) − 2d minimum rewinding intervals. By setting g = 2, we also obtain a proof for Claim 4.
It now follows from Claim 1, 2, 7 and Claim 8 that a random tape is bad with probability at most 1
which is negligible if k g ∈ ω(log n).
Proof of Main Lemma and Consequences
Lemma 1 (Main Lemma). Assuming the existence of one-way functions, then for every k, g ∈ N such that k/g ∈ ω(log n), there exists an O(k)-round concurrent zero knowledge argument with precision p(t) ∈ O(t · 2 log g t ) for all languages in N P.
Proof. Using Lemmata 7 and 8, we conclude that the simulator S V * (using simulate g ) outputs a verifier view of the right distribution with precision O(t · 2 log g t ).
We can derive the following results using Lemma 1 with appropriate parameters for k and g: Theorem 1. Assuming the existence of one-way functions, for every ε > 0, there exists a ω(log n)-round concurrent zero knowledge argument for all languages in N P with precision p(t) = O(t 1+ε ).
Proof. Taking g = 2 1/ε and k ∈ ω(log n), we have that k/g ∈ ω(log n), then it follows from Lemma 1 that we have a simulation with precision
Proof. Taking, g = n /2 and k = n , again we have that k/g = n ε/2 ∈ ω(log n) and it follows from Lemma 1 that we have a simulation with precision
Statistically Precise Concurrent Zero-Knowledge
In this section, we construct a statistically precise concurrent ZK argument for all of N P.
Recall that statistically precise ZK requires the simulation of all malicious verifiers (even those having a priori unbounded running time) and the distribution of the simulated view must be statistically close to that of the real view. A first approach is to use the previous protocol and simulator with the splitting factor fixed appropriately. Recall that the probability of the simulator failing on a single thread is
where k is the number of rounds, g is the splitting factor, and t is the running time of the verifier. Notice that when the running time t of the verifier is "big", e.g. O(n poly(n) ) (n is the security parameter), even if the splitting factor g is set to n, we need the number of rounds k to be super polynomial in n to ensure that the probability is exponentially small. Hence we can not hope to obtain a statistically precise simulation by using this simulator directly.
We modify this simulator to work for all verifiers. On a high level, our simulator runs the original simulate procedure S V * with g = n for a fixed number of steps, say up to the iteration whent = 2 n log n 2 . If actual running time exceeds that, our simulator, rather than investing time in rewinding the verifier, instead proceeds with a "straight-line" simulation of the verifier, extracting the "challenge" σ using a brute-force search.
Theorem 3. Assume the existence of claw-free permutations, then there exists a poly(n)-round statistically precise concurrent zero-knowledge argument for all of N P with precision p(n, t) = O(t 1+ 1 log n ).
Description of protocol:
We essentially use the same protocol described in Section 3 7 setting the number of rounds k = 5n 2 log n (n is the security parameter), with the following exception: In Stage 2 of the protocol, the prover uses perfectly hiding commitments in the BH-protocol instead of computational hiding. This makes the BH-protocol perfect-special-HVZK.
Description of simulator S: The simulator S executes S V * with g = n and outputs whatever S V * outputs, with the following exception: while executing simulate n (inside S V * ), if the verifier in the main thread runs for more than 2 n log 2 n steps, it terminates the execution of simulate n and retrieves the partial history hist simulated in the main thread so far. Then, it continues to simulate the verifier from hist in a "straight-line" fashion-it generates uniformly random messages for the Stage 1 of the protocol, and when it reaches Stage 2 of the protocol for some session, it runs the brute-force-prove procedure instead. We provide the formal description of the brute-force-prove procedure in Figure 7 , which is essentially the prove procedure in Figure 4 , with the exception that the challenge σ is extracted using brute-force search.
The brute-force-prove Procedure. Let s ∈ [m] be the session for which the prove procedure is invoked. The procedure outputs either p or p, whichever is required by S V * . Let hist denote the set of messages exchanged between S V * and V * .
1. If the verifier has aborted in any of the k first stage messages of session s (i.e., hist contains Vj=ABORT for j ∈ [k] of session s), abort session s.
2. Otherwise, use brute-force search to find a value σ, such that β is a valid commitment for β. If no such σ is found, abort session s (indicating invalid commitment from the verifier). Otherwise, and proceed as follows. Running time of S: Let v denote the view output by S. We show that the running time of S is O(t 1+log n 2 ), if t is the running time of V * on view v. Depending on the size of t, there are two cases:
Case t > 2 n log 2 n : In this case, the simulator terminates the procedure simulate n and continues with a straight-line simulation. The procedure simulate n runs for at most (2 n log 2 n ) 1+log n 2 < t 1+log n 2 steps before it is cut-off (since the verifier runs for at most 2 n log 2 n before the procedure is cut-off), while the straight-line simulation takes at most t2 n (since there are at most t sessions, and for each session it takes at most 2 n steps to brute-force extract the challenge σ). Thus, the total running time of the simulator is at most t 1+log n 2 + t2 n < 2t 1+log n 2 (since 2 n < t log n 2 ).
Case t ≤ 2 n log 2 n : In this case, the simulator executes simulate n to completion and from Lemma 7, it follows that the running time of the simulator is t 1+log n 2 .
Therefore, in both the cases the running time of the simulator is bounded by 2t 1+log n 2 .
Indistinguishability of simulation: First, we show in Lemma 2 that the simulator fails with exponentially small probability. Then, the indistinguishability of the simulation essentially follows from the special honest-verifier ZK property of the protocol in the second stage. For completeness, we give the proof below in Lemma 3.
Lemma 2. For all x ∈ L, z ∈ {0, 1} * and all verifiers V * , S V * (x, z) outputs ⊥ with exponentially small probability.
Proof. There are two cases when the simulator fails. We describe each of these cases and show that with exponentially small probability the simulator fails in each case. Lemma 2 then follows using the union bound.
The simulator gets stuck on a thread due to a bad random tape: This case occurs only when simulate n runs for less than 2 n log 2 n steps. From the analysis presented in the previous section, it follows that with probability at most 1 2 (5n log 2 n−2 log n t) the procedure outputs ⊥ on each thread and there are at most t 1+log n 2 threads. Hence, the overall probability of simulator outputting ⊥ in this case is t 1+log n 2 1 2 (5n log 2 n−2 log n t) ≤ 2 (n log 2 n+n) 1 2 3n log 2 n when t < 2 n log 2 n . Therefore, the probability that the simulator fails due to a bad random tape is exponentially small.
The simulator gets stuck on a session because it sends the same P j message: This happens with probability 1 2 k for every slot, where k is the length of the prover challenge (this is the same k as the round complexity of the protocol). Since, there are at most t 1+log n 2 slots, using the union bound, we obtain that the simulator fails with probability at most t 1+log n 2 1 2 k ≤ 2 (n log 2 n+n) 1 2 5n 2 log 2 n which is again exponentially small. Lemma 3. The ensembles view S V * (x, z) x∈L,z∈{0,1}
* and {view V * (x, z)} x∈L,z∈{0,1} * are statistically close over L.
Towards the goal of proving the ensembles are statistically close, as in Lemma 5, we consider the "intermediate" simulator S that on input x (and auxiliary input z), proceeds just like S in order to generate Stage 1 of the view, but proceeds as the honest prover in order to generate messages in Stage 2 of the view. Using the same argument presented in Claim 5, it follows that the {view S V * (x, z)} and {view V * (x, z)} are statistically close over L. Therefore, it suffices to show that the ensembles {view S V * (x, z)} and {view S V * (x, z)} are statistically close. In fact, we show below in Claim 9 that they are identically distributed and the proof of the lemma follows.
Claim 9. The ensembles {view S V * (x, z)} and {view S V * (x, z)} are identical.
Proof. Using similar hybrid arguments presented in Claim 6, we can show that the ensembles are identical.
Assume for contradiction, that the claim is false, i.e. there exists a deterministic verifier V * (we assume w.l.o.g that V * deterministic, as its random-tape can be fixed) such that the ensembles in the statement of the claim are not identical. We consider several hybrid simulators, S i for i = 0 to 2 n log 2 n . S i proceeds exactly like S, with the exception that in the first i proofs that reach the second stage, it proceeds using the honest prover strategy in the second stage for those proofs. By construction S 0 = S and S 2 n log 2 n = S (since there are at most 2 n log 2 n sessions, after which the simulator is cut off). Since, by assumption the output of S 0 and S 2 n log 2 n are not identically distributed, there must exist some j such that the output of S j and S j+1 are different. Furthermore, since S j proceeds exactly as S j+1 in the first j sessions that reach the second stage, and by construction they proceed identically in the first stage in all sessions, there exists a partial view V of S j and S j+1 -which defines an instance for the protocol in the second stage of the j + 1 session-such that the output of S j and S j+1 are not identical conditioned on the event that S j and S j+1 feed V * the view v. Since the only difference between the view of V * in S j and S j+1 is that while the former simulates a view using the special honest-verifier ZK property of the BH-protocol, the later follows the honest prover strategy, we contradict the perfect special honest-verifier ZK property of the protocol in the second stage of the protocol.
Remark:
We require the commitments in BH protocol to be perfectly hiding to show that the ensembles are identical, since we consider a large number of intermediate hybrids (e.g. 2 n 2 ) in the proof.
A The Mapping f [PRS02, Ros04]
Recall that two distinct rewinding intervals are either disjoint, or one is entirely contained in the other. Let S denote a maximal set of disjoint minimal rewinding intervals determined by the reference thread. Further, let δ j denote the number times the j th interval in S is simulated after the very last run of the (j − The input is a random tape ρ ∈ R, and a sequence u = u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u |S| ∈ ∆. The output is a random tape ρ u1,...,u |S| ∈ R.
• Set ρ u0 ← ρ.
• For j = 1, . . . , |S|:
1. Let ρ w denote the portion of ρ u1,...,uj−1 used in w th run of j th minimal interval in S.
2. Swap locations of ρ uj and ρ 1 within ρ u1,...,uj−1 , and denote the resulting tape by ρ u1,...,uj .
• Output ρ u1,...,u |S| . Figure 9 : Mapping h S .
